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Abstract—Online social networks (OSN) constitute an integral
part of people’s every day social activity. Specifically, mainstream
OSNs such as Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook are especially
prominent in adolescents’ lives for communicating with other
people online, expressing and entertain themselves, and finding
information. However, adolescents face a significant number
of threats when using online platforms. Some of these threats
include aggressive behavior and cyberbullying, sexual grooming,
false news and fake activity, radicalization, and exposure of
personal information and sensitive content. There is a pressing
need for parental control tools and Internet content filtering
techniques to protect the vulnerable groups that use online
platforms. Existing parental control tools occasionally violate the
privacy of adolescents, leading them to use other communication
channels to avoid moderation. In this work, we design and
implement a user-centric Family Advice Suite with Guardian
Avatars aiming at preserving the privacy of the individuals
towards their custodians and towards the advice tool itself.
Moreover, we present a systematic process for designing and
developing state of the art techniques and a system architecture
to prevent minors’ exposure to numerous risks and dangers while
using Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube on a browser.
Index Terms—online social networks; online threats; cyberse-
curity risks; privacy; minors.
I. INTRODUCTION
The majority of teens (85%) use more than one social media
site according to a Pew Research Center [1] survey (N=743).
A 2018 poll (N=1001) [2] found that the average 5 to 15 year-
olds spend about 15 hours online every week. Additionally,
90% of the 11 to 16 year-olds surveyed said that they have
an online social network account. These numbers illustrate
that the overwhelming majority of young people use OSNs,
even if they are not old enough to register accounts for most
of the mainstream OSNs legally (like Facebook, Instagram,
Twitter, YouTube, Snapchat). Alarmingly, there are many risks
adolescents are exposed to when using OSNs. Specifically,
a 2019 study [3] of 21648 primary school children and
18186 secondary school children found that 16% and 19%,
accordingly, had seen content that encouraged people to hurt
themselves. The same study reports that 11 to 18 year-olds
reported seeing sexual content in the most popular OSNs.
Last, reviews from 2059 young people aged 11 to 18, show
that the 16% witnessed violence and hatred, 16% encountered
sexual content, and the 18% witnessed others being victims
of cyberbullying. A different study conducted in 2018 found
that 59% of U.S. teens have been victims of cyberbullying or
harassment online. Additionally, about a third (32%) of teens
report that someone has spread false rumors about them on the
Internet, while smaller shares (16%) have been the target of
physical threats online. It is important to note that the majority
of the victims tend to be females. The study concludes that
59% of the parents worry that their child might be getting
bullied online, but most are confident they can teach their teen
about acceptable online behavior [4].
Overall, the popularity of the Internet and OSN usage, in
particular, is very high and with an increasing tendency among
youngsters. Thus, the online risks for these sensitive age
groups received increased awareness. To design an architecture
for the protection of youngsters in OSNs, we list the most
frequent dangers the young users might encounter. Literature
[4]–[6] agrees to the following distinctive threats: i) cyberbul-
lying, ii) cyberpredators, iii) sensitive information leakage, iv)
manipulated content and pornography, and v) offensive images
and messages.
Contributions. In summary, this work makes the following
contributions:
1) The design and implementation of a privacy-preserving
Cybersafety Family Advice Suite(CFAS) that utilizes
machine learning classifiers and other filters to protect
minors when using OSNs.
2) CFAS makes efforts to keep the minors fully aware of
what their custodians and what the Family Advice Suite
can monitor, filter, and analyze about their online activity.
3) CFAS uses its architecture to spread awareness to the
custodians and the minors about the various threats they
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face when using OSNs. Also, it utilizes the Guardian
Avatars that interact and advise the adolescents in a direct
and user-friendly way.
4) The proposed architecture can accurately detect: (i) cy-
berbullying; (ii) sexual grooming; (iii) abusive users;
(iv) bot accounts; (v) personal information exposure;
(vi) sensitive content in pictures; (vii) hateful and racist
memes; and (viii) disturbing videos.
II. ARCHITECTURAL OVERVIEW
In this section, we describe the main pillars of our archi-
tecture. This architecture comprises the following: 1) OSN
Data Analytics Software Stack; 2) Intelligent Web-Proxy; and
3) browser add-on. For the tool to work efficiently, all three
components interact with each other, but none depends on the
other to function. Figure 1 depicts the proposed architecture of
the CFAS framework, including its main components and the
interfaces that interconnects them. In the following sections,
we describe each component of our architecture along with
their main purposes and functionalities.
A. OSN Data Analytics Software Stack
The first component of the CFAS architecture is the OSN
Data Analytics Software Stack, referred as the Back-End hence
forth. This is a single machine which is responsible to train
machine learning algorithms for the detection of threats in
OSNs. The trained classifiers and detection rules created on
this machine are sent automatically to the registered Intelligent
Web-Proxies (IWP) when available (see # in Figure 1). In
addition, the Back-End stores anonymized OSN traffic data
from the registered IWPs only if both the custodian and the
minor give their explicit consent (4* in the figure). These
anonymized data are used to retrain the machine machine
learning algorithms hosted in the Back-End to extract more
accurate and intelligent classifiers, which are sent back to the
IWPs to replace the existing classifiers as shown in step # in
Figure 1.
B. Intelligent Web-Proxy
The Intelligent Web-Proxy(IWP) is a small device that is
connected to the router of the service provider in the house of
the protected family. The IWP consists of three main modules
which handle specific tasks. We detail each module below.
1) DOM Tree Analysis: This part of the IWP is responsible
to capture all the incoming and outgoing traffic of the user
(child). Note that the word user refers to the child protected
by our architecture hence forth. First, the user requests a web-
page using their browser (see 1 at Figure 1). The response
of this request is sent to the IWP: the DOM Tree Analysis
module, specifically (step 3 in the figure). After capturing
the traffic, the DOM Tree Analysis module handles TLS
connections and performs TLS termination to decrepit HTTPS
websites (only Facebook and Twitter currently). Importantly,
the IWP is tested to manage high network traffic load and
extract the webpage content from the captured DOM tree. At
the same time, the same data are sent to the Data Access
Layer for analysis (see 4 in Figure 1). We describe how the
Data Access Layer (DAL) works below.
2) Data Access Layer: The Data Access Layer hosts all
the trained classifiers and detection rules generated from the
Back-End which are used to check all the received captured
traffic.
Figure 2 demonstrates the functionality of the Data Access
Layer, which is the main storage area hosted in the IWP
and the Back-End of the CFAS infrastructure. First, the data
captured by the DOM Tree Analysis are sent to the Decision
Mechanism of DAL (step 1 in Figure 2). Every bit of informa-
tion (Facebook chat, Facebook news-feed pictures, Facebook
posts created by the user, Facebook pictures uploaded by the
user, visited YouTube videos, and visited Twitter user profiles)
is sent individually. Upon reception of this data the Decision
mechanism creates a unique Execution ID (ExecID), see step
2 in the figure. This unique string is used by the Decision
mechanism to define the job number of the trained classifier
which is used to analyze the data.
Then, the Decision mechanism requests the Data Access
API to store this data in the database: a MongoDB (step
3). Once the data is stored, the Data Access API binds this
data with a unique number which is used as a primary key
to identify this data: DataID. The DataID is sent back to
the Decision mechanism (step 4) which is combined with
the ExecID to call the suitable trained classifier to detect
suspicious behavior (see step 5). Once the trained classifier
receives the ExecID and the DataID, it sends the DataID to
the Data Access API to request the retrieval of data for analysis
(step 6), which in return are sent back to the trained classifier
(step 7). Once the trained classifier finished the analysis of the
data, it sends its results to the Data Access API, along with
the ExecID and DataID to be stored in the database (step 8).
Then, the trained classifier informs the Decision Mechanism
that it finished its job by sending back the ExecID and DataID
(step 9).
In response, the Decision Mechanism requests the results
of the job from the Data Access API (step 10) and the
Data Access API responds with the results of the analysis
(step 11). Last, based on the results of the trained classifier,
and thresholds set in the Decision mechanism, the Decision
mechanism is responsible to decide whether a notification
needs to be sent to the user via the CFAS browser add-on,
and to the custodian of the user, via the Parental Console.
If this is the case, the Decision Mechanism triggers an event
via the Notification Module (step 12). Note that step 12 in
Figure 2 is the same as step 5 and step 5* in Figure 1.
3) Parental Console: The last component hosted in the
Intelligent Web-Proxy is the Parental Console. The Parental
Console is a fine grained web-based platform which enables
the custodian of the user to manage which data of the user
(child) he/she and the IWP can see. Also, via the Parental Con-
sole, the custodian can choose what the IWP filters, blocks,
Fig. 1. Cybersafety Family Advice Suite Architecture
Fig. 2. Data Access Layer
and set the level of the child’s cybersafety. To set these options
in operation, the child gets notifications on their browser
add-on through the Notification Module, informing them that
their custodian has made some changes in the options. We
highlight that for these options to operate, the child needs
to approve them via their browser add-on. This way, we
ensure that the child gave their consent about what the IWP
captures, analyzes, filters, and blocks. At the same time this
functionality allows for the child to know what notifications
their custodian will be receiving about the online activity of the
child, and what OSN traffic activity the custodian can see. We
note that our proposed architecture promotes a conversation
and close communication between the custodian and the child.
This way, the family protected by CFAS can agree on what
online activity of the child the custodians need to monitor, and
what are the main risks and threats involved in using OSNs.
Moreover, this architecture promotes OSN threat awareness,
hence enforcing a culture of safe OSN usage. To achieve this,
we introduce specific Parental and Back-End visibility options,
and Cybersafety options.
1) Parental Visibility Options: These options define what
the custodian of the user can see, while enabling various levels
of monitoring for the custodians, always with the explicit
consent of the user. We define three Visibility Levels:
• Level 1: This is the lowest level of parental visibility,
meaning that the custodian cannot see any data regarding
the OSN traffic of the user. We note that the custodian still
receives notifications regarding the threats detected by the
trained classifiers hosted in the IWP, without mentioning
the name of the perpetrator. A notification example: “John
might be a victim of cyberbullying”, where John is the
name of the child protected by CFAS.
• Level 2: This level of visibility allows the custodian to see
data regarding the Facebook wall, photos, notifications,
and friends of the child. The custodian can select the data
that they wish to see. Once the user gives their consent
via their browser add-on for this data to be visible to the
custodian, the visibility option is operational. A notifica-
tion example: “John might be a victim of cyberbullying
by Eve”, where John is the protected child, and Eve is
the perpetrator.
• Level 3: This is the default and highest level of parental
visibility. When this option is selected, it adds all the
options from Level 2, along with data regarding the user’s
Facebook chat. So at this level, the custodian of the
child can see all the incoming and outgoing traffic of
the child’s Facebook wall, photos, notifications, friends,
and chat. A notification example: “John might be a victim
of cyberbullying by Eve. Click here to see the suspicious
chat”. This way the custodian can see portions of the chat
between the user and the perpetrator, that show signs of
cyberbullying.
We note that these options expire once every six months, so
the custodian and the child can reset them as they wish. All
the above levels of visibility can be set up after a mutual
agreement between the custodian and the user while keeping
the user fully aware of what their custodian can see.
3) Back-End Visibility options: Through the Back-End
Visibility options, the Cybersafety Family Advice Suite offers
options regarding which OSN traffic data is sent to the Back-
End. OSN traffic data sent to the Back-End are used to
retrain the machine learning algorithms and detection rules
hosted there to make them more accurate in future predictions.
The custodian can choose among the child’s Facebook wall,
photos, notifications, friends, and chat. We note that the user
needs to give their consent for this data to be sent to the Back-
End. We define the following Back-End Visibility Levels:
• Level 1: This is the lowest level of Back-End visibility.
If this options is set, no data is sent to the Back-End.
• Level 2: In this level the custodian allows the IWP to send
data to the Back-End regarding the child’s Facebook wall,
friend’s Facebook wall, and the child’s Facebook friends
profiles. The custodian may select one or all of the above.
Also, these data may be sent anonymized or not.
• Level 3: This is the highest level of Back-End visibility.
When this option is selected, it allows the custodian
to send all the data from level 2, in addition to the
child’s Facebook chats. Once again, this data may be sent
anonymized or not, and always with the consent of both
the custodian and the child.
4) Cybersafety Options: Last, the Parental Console allows
the custodian to choose the child’s level of Cybersafety. These
options define how aggressive the IWP can be, regarding the
protection of the user: what the IWP can filter, protect, block,
replace, encrypt, or watermark. This options can be configured
at two different levels:
• Level 1: This is the lowest level of cybersafety: it
only pushes notifications to the browser add-on and
the Parental Console, without performing any protec-
tion (replacement, protection, encryption, filtering). This
means that the IWP still detects suspicious activity, but
it does not hide or protect any content for the user.
Instead, it pushes notifications to the user explaining
that certain suspicious or malicious activity is detected.
Via the Parental Console, the custodian can choose the
notifications they wish to receive for each detection
mechanism. The detection mechanisms include: a) cyber
Grooming; b) hate or inappropriate speech (cyberbully-
ing); c) distressed behavior (when the child is suicidal,
scared, depressed); d) fake activity (fake OSN profiles); e)
personal information exposure (when the child is about
to publish personal information); f) hateful memes; g)
inappropriate YouTube videos; and h) sensitive content
in pictures (when the child is about to share a benign
picture that includes nudity without protection: a picture
in swim suit).
• Level 2: At this level the custodian may choose any
of the above detection mechanisms to take action and
filter, replace, protect, encrypt, or block content before it
reaches the browser of the protected child. The detection
mechanisms remain the same as level 1, but the custodian
needs to select at least one to be operational for this level
to hold.
Overall, the IWP is responsible for capturing the incoming
and outgoing traffic of Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube of
the user and send it to the locally hosted trained classifiers to
detect malicious activity. In case suspicious activity is detected
by one or more trained classifiers the IWP pushes a notification
to the browser add-on of the user to inform them about the
imminent threat detected. At the same time, the suspicious
malicious content is blocked or filtered by the browser add-on
to protect the minor, if this Cybersafety Option level is set by
the custodian and the user. The IWP hosts trained classifiers
and detection rules to perform the following actions:
1) detect nudity in images included in the captured traffic;
2) encrypt sensitive images with steganography;
3) detect and warn the minor in case they are about to share
personal information;
4) detect cyberbullying in Facebook conversations;
5) detect sexual grooming in Facebook conversations;
6) detect hateful and racist memes in Facebook feed;
7) detect bot, aggressive, bully, and spam Twitter users;
8) detect inappropriate videos for children in YouTube;
9) provide sentiment analysis of the chat of the minor;
10) generate informative notifications to the minor;
11) push notifications to the custodian about an incidence
(e.g., sexual grooming);
12) push notifications to the user (child) through the add-on;
13) submit data to the Back-End through a secure tunnel; and
14) block adult, or any other site, defined by the custodian.
C. Browser add-on
The last component of our architecture is the browser add-
on (CFAS add-on in Figure 1). The browser add-on is the
gateway between the IWP and the user, responsible to inform
the user about the threats detected from the IWP, and the
Visibility and Cybersafety options set by their custodian.
Importantly, our browser add-on operates as a Guardian
Avatar that the child may interact with to ask for advice. Our
avatar operates as the guardian angel of the user, while using
different OSN platforms (Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube
only, currently). By following the Guardian Avatar approach
as a gamification feature [7], CFAS aims to encourage the
users to use it and interact with it because of its extended
usability and improved user experience functionalities.
In addition, the user can select their favourite avatar icon
from a list of icons. The Guardian Avatar will ‘follow’ the
user in their online-activities as a virtual friend. When the IWP
detects any malicious behaviour or incidents, the notifications
(warnings, advice, etc.) appear as chat bubbles of the avatar,
in a friendly and encouraging text. With the addition of the
avatar, it is expected that the CFAS warnings and advice will
be less disturbing for children(especially for the adolescents)
and will make users more willing to use it.
Fig. 3. Guardian Avatar notifies the minor of any detected incidents
The browser add-on can:
1) notify the user about the activity detected by the IWP;
2) notify the user about what their custodian can see based
on the preferences (Parental Visibility options) applied;
3) notify the user about what data is sent to the Back-
End to aid the machine learning algorithms become more
accurate (Back-End Visibility options);
4) let the user change the options about what OSN traffic
activity their custodian can see;
5) let the user change the options about what data is sent to
the Back-End;
6) let the user flag content/text as cyberbullying activity, sex-
ual cyber grooming activity, aggressive behavior activity,
fake identity activity, and false information activity in
case the IWP failed to detect so;
7) let the user flag sensitive or nudity content in case the
IWP failed to detect so; and
8) let the user flag content/text as an incorrect sensitive
content, cyberbullying, sexual grooming, aggressive be-
havior, fake identity, and false information activity in case
the IWP detected so.
III. DESIGN
We now detail the design of the proposed architecture.
Instead of simple rule-based filters, our architecture utilizes
advanced machine learning algorithms. The downside of hav-
ing rule-based filters is that they are blunt. There are situations
where there is a particular piece of content that technically
does not violate the specified policies, but when this content is
analyzed with advanced machine learning techniques, it might
turn out to be hate speech, sarcasm, sexual grooming, etc.
Such techniques allow us to detect bullies or predators that
are close to the line. To sum up, the aim is to have these
granular standards so that our design can control for bias. Our
design approach is based on the following design principles:
1) We place all the functionalities (filters, text replacement,
notifications, data submission to the Back-End, etc.) in the
IWP instead of the browser add-on when it can be correctly
and efficiently implemented. This way we prevent a minor
from modifying or disabling the system’s functionality through
the browser add-on. For example, in case a minor accidentally
or willingly disables the browser add-on, the IWP does not
get affected and all the processes and functionalities can
continue their operation normally (given that the device is still
configured to route social network services through the IWP;
with the assumption that the minor user does not have the
permissions or access to do so). Also, the IWP can notify the
parent through the Parental Console that the browser add-on
of the minor is not responding anymore.
This architecture aims to provide the ability to seamlessly
support multiple types of clients (desktop browsers, mobile
apps, etc.) with minimal client or client platform configura-
tions or modifications. Moreover, the browser add-on does
not support complex functionalities other than javascript and
HTML scripts. Text replacement, picture encryption, filtering
etc., are too complex functionalities to run on a browser add-
on. In case the IWP is down, the browser add-ons should
call REST API requests from the Back-End every time they
need to identify suspicious content, e.g., cyberbullying. Having
some functionalities on the IWP prevents it from calling
REST API requests from the Back-End every time it needs to
identify suspiciously content, e.g., cyberbullying. In addition,
placing some functionalities on the IWP, solves the potential
problem of the whole system being down in case of Back-
End unavailability, thus solving the problem of single-point
failure. Examples: i) The IWP can push notification to the
browser add-on without the need of the Back-End. ii) Before
any content reaches the minor’s device, the IWP can replace
cyberbullying content without calling REST API requests from
the Back-End, using the functionality installed on it already.
2) Rules and trained classifiers are generated in the Back-
End. Trained classifiers are placed on the IWP only if they can
run efficiently. The Back-End collects data from all the IWPs
to generate detection rules or trained classifiers. Data collected
from the IWPs are used to generate cyberbullying, sexual
cyber grooming, distressed behavior, aggressive behavior, fake
identity, and false information detection rules.
3) Warning, flagging, and feedback functionality is placed
on the browser add-on. Warnings are displayed in dialogue
boxes from the Guardian Avatar to the user through the add-on
after a notification pushed by the IWP based on the suspicious
behavior detected. The users should be able to flag content
as a cyberbullying activity, sexual cyber grooming activity,
aggressive behavior activity, fake identity, false information,
and sensitive pictures through the browser add-on in case the
IWP failed to identify them. The users should be able to give
their feedback based on the activity detected by the IWP. For
example, in case the IWP detects cyberbullying, it pushes
a notification to the browser add-on. The Guardian Avatar
shows the notification/warning to the user explaining that
cyberbullying was detected. Then, the user can give feedback
on whether the detection of the IWP was right or not.
4) The minor can check the content that their custodian,
the IWP, and the Back-End can see. The custodian can set up
the Visibility settings in a fine-grained way and always with
the consent of the minor. This way we enable various levels
of monitoring for parents and the Back-End with the child’s
consent, while keeping the child fully aware of what their
custodians and the Back-End can see, e.g., chat messages.
Overall, the aim is to build a system that eases the tension
of ensuring the safety of minors, while respecting their privacy
with respect to what their custodians and 3rd parties can see.
By automating the detection of malicious communication, we
enable custodians to be continuously aware of their child’s
safety. This is achieved without the parent having to go through
the minor’s online communication manually, thus, without
having to invade the minor’s privacy. Our approach aims to
warn the custodians about the suspicious online activity that
was detected, without violating the privacy of the minor. For
example, if the minor has a Facebook online conversation with
sexual content with somebody, the custodian of the minor will
receive a warning that such a conversation is taking place,
once the IWP captures it. Still, the parent won’t be able to see
the actual content because that would violate the teenager’s
privacy. Instead, the parent can only see the actual conversation
through their Parental Console once the explicit consent of the
child has been granted. To sum up, our design principles intend
to encourage custodians to have a conversation with the minor;
thus, bringing families closer and spreading awareness about
the numerous threats that exist in contemporary OSNs.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
We implement all the architecture components and integra-
tion’s that we describe in Sections II and III. In this section
we provide the details of the prototype implementation.
A. Detection of Abusive Users on Twitter
When the minor visits a Twitter user account, the IWP
captures the username of the visited user and it calls the
Twitter API to collect the last 20 tweets (including retweets)
of that user.1 This information is then sent to a classifier
developed by Chatzakou et al. [8] for analysis. The developed
classifier analyzes the tweets to detect whether a Twitter user
1https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs
is aggressive, bully, spam, or normal. Based on the classifier’s
detection, the user and their custodian receive a notification
on the browser add-on and the Parental Console, respectively.
B. Detection of Hateful and Racist memes on Facebook
The IWP captures the Facebook incoming and outgoing
traffic of the minor and performs TLS termination of the DOM
tree. All the images that are extracted from the DOM tree are
sent to the classifier developed by Zannettou et al. [9] to
be labeled as a hateful meme or not. In case the detection is
positive the picture will be automatically replaced by the IWP
with a static image to inform the minor.
Similarly, when the minor uploads an image on Facebook,
the picture is analyzed by the aforementioned classifier to
detect whether that image is hateful or racist. In case the
classifier returns a positive detection, then the guardian avatar
warns the minor that the image they tried to upload contains
hateful content and they shouldn’t upload it.
C. Sexual Predator Detection on Facebook
When the minor is chatting with a friend on Facebook,
the conversation is captured by the IWP and is sent to the
classifier developed by Partaourides et al. [10] for analysis.
A previous version of this classifier used data from Perverted
Justice to be trained in order to recognize patterns similar
to the ones from convicted sexual predators.2 Upon positive
detection, the IWP pushes a notification to the browser add-on
of the minor, notifying them that signs of sexual predator have
been detected. The custodian can see only portions of the chat
between the minor and the predator via the Parental Console,
only if the minor consents so via the Parental Visibility options
explained in Section II. We note that the custodian can only
see portions of the chat: the portion that the classifier detects
as suspicious sexual grooming pattern.
D. Cyberbullying Detection on Facebook
Similar to the Sexual Predator detection, when the minor
is chatting with a friend on Facebook, the conversation is
captured by the IWP and is sent to the classifier developed
by Partaourides et al. [10] for analysis. This classifier returns
percentages of how angry, frustrated, and sad the minor
is during the Facebook chat conversation, using sentiment
analysis. If the child any of the three feelings exceed 65%, the
IWP pushes a notification to the browser add-on of the child to
warn them that the Facebook chat they are having seems to be
toxic for them. Similar to the sexual predator detection above,
the custodian is only able to see portions of the suspicious
chat, only if the minor gave their consent beforehand.
2http://www.perverted-justice.com/
E. Fake and Bot user detection on Twitter
When the minor visits an account on Twitter, the IWP
captures the username of the Twitter account and sends it for
analysis via a REST API call developed by Astroscreen3 and
Echeverria et al. [11]. This API returns True if the Twitter user
account is a bot, and False otherwise. In case of the former,
the IWP pushes a notification to the browser add-on of the
minor, and to the Parental Console of the custodian (based on
the Parental Visibility options).
F. Personal Information Leakage Detection on Facebook
When the minor tries to make a post on Facebook, the IWP
captures the text written by the minor and performs analysis
on it to detect dates, times, phone numbers, phone numbers
with extensions, links, emails, IP addresses, IPv6 addresses,
prices, credit card numbers, street addresses, and zip codes.
We implement this detection technique using existing Python
libraries [12]. In case any of the above personal information is
detected, the IWP pushes a warning to the minor to edit their
post. In case the minor dismisses these warning, a notification
is sent to the Parental Console of the custodian (in accordance
with the Parental Visibility options).
G. Watermarking and Steganography
For the purposes of this detection mechanism, we consider
any image that includes nudity (topless images of boys, or
swim suit images) as sensitive content images. When the minor
tries to send a sensitive image to a friend over Facebook chat,
the image first passes in the IWP for analysis. We followed
similar techniques to Ghazali et al. [13] and Kolkur et al. [14]
to develop our skin and nudity detection techniques. In case
the image contains sensitive content, the IWP watermarks
it.4 Then, the IWP hides the original image in another static
image using steganography. This way, only the person that the
picture was sent to is allowed to see the hidden original image.
We note that for this to work, the receiver needs to be part
of the Cybersafety Family Advice Suite network. Similarly,
if the minor tries to post a picture that contains sensitive
content on their Facebook wall, the IWP performs the above
mentioned watermarking and steganography techniques and
posts the static image on Facebook instead. The minor, using
the browser add-on can set who is able to see this picture
(family members, friends, classmates). For this scenario, we
assume that the minor allows the image to be visible to family
members only, and that their family members are registered
CFAS members and have their own IWP set up at home. When
a family member of the minor scrolls Facebook, their IWP
captures that image and communicates with the CFAS Back-
End to check if they have permission to see this image. If this
is the case, then the IWP decryptes the image automatically.
In case the image does not contain sensitive content, the
IWP only applies watermarking on it before posting it. The
3https://www.astroscreen.com/
4http://code.activestate.com/recipes/362879/
receivers that are not part of the CFAS network can only see
the static encrypted image.
H. Disturbing videos on YouTube
Our architecture also detects disturbing YouTube videos for
young children, using the developed classifier by Papadamou
et al. [15]. This classifier can discern inappropriate content
with 84.3% accuracy. When a minor visits a YouTube video,
the IWP captures the YouTube link (which includes the
YouTube video ID) and it calls the YouTube API to collect
the video features.5 The features we receive from the YouTube
API include the video upload date, likes, tag, title, thumbnail,
etc. The IWP then sends the video features received by
YouTube API to the developed classifier for analysis. In case
the classifier returns positive detection (inappropriate) then it
warns the minor that the video they are watching is not suitable
for them via the browser add-on.
V. EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate the performance of the prototype
implementation of the Cybersafety Family Advice Suite.
A. Performance Evaluation
To ptest the performance in regard to the number of con-
current users, we set a small home cluster using a laptop
with 4GB Ram, a quad-core Intel Core i5 processor that
is running Ubuntu 18.04 64bit and Google Chrome Version
80.0.3987.162 (64 Bit), which is used as the minors’ laptop
that hosts the browser add-on. In addition, we set up 2 virtual
machines with 2GB RAM each, and one tablet of 3GB RAM:
4 users in total. The IWP is a virtual machine hosted on
the Google cloud, configured with 4GB RAM, a dual-core
Intel Xeon CPU, running Centos 7 (64 Bit) and it is using
the mitmproxy6: the HTTPS proxy. Akso, the IWP hosts a
MongoDB for Data storage and Python3 for the API Calls.
We run the experiments with a downlink of ∼20 Mbps and
uplink of ∼5 Mbps.
Figure 4 depicts the time in milliseconds needed for OSN
actions to be executed with and without CFAS. Each ma-
chine executes the OSN actions using a JavaScript automated
method, in a serial manner. Then, we calculate the average
time that each machine needed to finish each action using the
start time and end time of each action. We observe that with
CFAS there are reasonable delays regarding the execution of
some actions (e.g. Facebook Login, Image Upload, Twitter
Login). This delay is acceptable since extra processing is
needed to load and execute the CFAS tools. Other actions’
delay is negligent (∼1 second).
5https://developers.google.com/youtube/v3
6https://mitmproxy.org/
Fig. 4. OSN actions with CFAS & without CFAS
B. User Experience
In this section, we present the results of an user experience
evaluation questionnaire given to minors and custodians after
interacting with CFAS. The participation of minors required
their custodians’ consent. The sample consists of 30 minors
and 12 custodians that had no knowledge or experience of the
CFAS tools. The questionnaires were GDPR-compliant and
anonymous. The study has received data protection approvals
by the Ethics Committee of the university and the national
data protection authority.
To evaluate our tools, the minors had to answer a va-
riety of questions regarding its usability, accessibility, and
performance. The minors were between 12 to 16 years old
that reported to use the Internet daily for entertainment and
education purposes. The percentages of minors in our sample
that have a registered Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube
account are 53.3%, 33.3% and 13.3%, respectively.
We report some of the results we obtained from the ques-
tionnaires given to minors and their custodians after using the
CFAS tools. When minors asked whether they would allow
CFAS to send notifications to their custodians, the majority
reported high, and complete agreement (see Figure 5). In
addition, the majority of minors believe that our tools could
potentially improve their safety when using OSNs, as depicted
in Figure 6. Importantly, all of the minors report being very
happy with the capabilities of CFAS in Figure 7. Alarmingly,
for the question of Figure 8 minor participants could report
one or more threats they experienced on OSNs. Many report
they had their personal data (24%) and their photo misused
(7%), being a victim of cyberbullying (7%), and witnessing
inappropriate speech and racism (37%) on social networks.
On the other hand, the overwhelming majority of the
custodians of the minors report that their child never reported
being a victim or a spectator of such threats online (Figure 9.
Although this is a small number of participants, it depicts that
it is usually the case that minors don’t report the threats they
face on OSNs to their custodians. Last, all of the custodians
agree that CFAS could improve the safety of minors online
(Figure 10, and the overwhelming majority of custodians
report that they would install CFAS at home (Figure 11).
VI. RELATED WORK
This section reviews some web-based and mobile applica-
tions that try to protect adolescents on the Internet and OSNs.
We list the ones most relevant to the concepts of CFAS.
Qustodio is a parental control software [16] that enables
parents to monitor and manage their kids’ web and offline
activity on their devices. It also tracks with whom the child
communicate on various OSNs and can be used as sensitive
content detection and protection tool (using filters). Last, it
monitors messages, calls, and the location of the minor’s
device. Kidlogger allows custodians to monitor what their chil-
dren are doing on their computer or smartphone [17]. It tracks
what the child type (Keystroke logging), keeps a schedule
of which websites they visit and what applications they use,
and with whom they are communicating on Facebook. Also,
Kidlogger offers sound recording of phone and online calls,
smartphone location tracking, and photo capture monitoring.
Web of Trust (WoT) is a browser add-on and smartphone
application for website reputation rating that warns users about
whether to trust a website or not [18]. Also, WoT provides site
reputation ratings to Facebook users to inform them about low
reputation links shown on their news feed.
Mspy is a smartphone application that monitors and almost
all the applications and activities on the smartphone of the
minor [19]. Alarmingly, the application may be installed on
the smartphone of the minor by the custodian and be hidden
from the minor so the minor cannot know they are being
monitored. Syfer [20] is a device, still in production, that
can be plugged into the router of the house network and
analyses the traffic activity for possible threats, for all the
devices connected to the network. It protects against cyber
threats in real-time, stops invasive data collection, offers a
VPN, has artificial intelligence for enhanced security, and
blocks advertisements. It doesn’t log any information, and it
offers encrypted activity. It restricts inappropriate content with
real-time website analysis provided by their AI engine. Bark
[21] monitors text messages, YouTube, emails, and 24 different
social networks for potential safety concerns. Bark looks for
activity that may indicate online predators, adult content,
sexting, cyberbullying, drug use, suicidal thoughts, and more.
In case anything suspicious is detected, the custodians will
receive automatic alerts along with expert recommendations
from child psychologists for addressing the issue. They offer
an application for iOS, Android, Kindle, browser add-ons for
Google chrome on PC and Safari on Mac, and Kindle. The
user has to allow the Bark application to send all the traffic
data to Bark’s Back-End for analysis and detection.
The majority of the existing applications follows a more
traditional approach (monitoring, restrictions over online activ-
ities). Those applications consider parents or custodians as the
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Fig. 5. (Minors) Would you allow CFAS to send notifications to your
custodian regarding suspicious detection? (1: Totally Disagree, 5: Totally
Agree)
1 2 3 4 5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
%
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 u
se
rs
Fig. 6. (Minors) Do you believe CFAS would improve your safety when
using OSNs? (1: Totally Disagree, 5: Totally Agree)
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Fig. 7. (Minors) Are you satisfied with CFAS capabilities? (1: Totally
Disagree, 5: Totally Agree)
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Fig. 8. (Minors) Have you ever experienced the following online-threats?
Select all that apply to you: (a) I prefer not to say; (b) None; (c) Personal
data misused; (d) Personal photo misused; (e) Cyberbullying; (f)
Inappropriate speech and racism; and (g) Sexual grooming
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Fig. 9. (Custodians) Has your child ever reported to you being a victim of
the following? (a) I prefer not to say; (b) None; (c) Personal data misused;
(d) Personal photo misused; (e) Cyberbullying; (f) Inappropriate speech and
racism; and (g) Sexual grooming
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Fig. 10. (Custodians) Do you think that CFAS would improve the safety of
minors when using OSNs? (1: Totally Disagree, 5: Totally Agree)
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Fig. 11. (Custodians) Would you install CFAS at home? (1: Totally
Disagree, 5: Totally Agree)
end-users and not children [22], [23]. Many of the applications
do not have interfaces for children but are just installed
as services running in the background of children’s device
[24]. A new notion suggests designing and developing tools
and software that is more “children-aware” and “children-
friendly”. Online safety applications should consider the child
as the major user and try to enrich children’s self-regulation
and their risk coping skills in cases of online dangers [25]. By
enforcing this child-friendly approach, we achieve a collabo-
ration where parents and children need to communicate and
discuss online risks and behavior in contrast with the approach
of restriction and monitoring. We aim on teaching children
how to cope with online threats and use social media with
responsibility and self-awareness. CFAS follows this approach
by involving the user (child) in the process of setting the
filters, parental and Back-end visibility options. In addition,
the cybersafety tools require the child’s consent to be activated.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present the architecture of a user-centric
privacy-preserving advanced family advice suite for the pro-
tection of minors on OSNs. The architecture comprises three
main components, the Data Analytics Software Stack, the
Intelligent Web-Proxy, and a browser add-on which operates
as a guardian angel of the child while using OSNs. This
architecture aims to protect minors when using OSNs while
preserving their privacy. We propose Guardian Avatars that
interact with, warn, and advise adolescences when they face
threats on OSNs. Also, the custodian of the adolescent receives
notifications on their Parental Console in case a malicious
activity is detected by the classifiers hosted on the Intelligent
Web-Proxy, so they are aware of the threats their child was
exposed to. Importantly, the custodian can only see the relevant
content, which indicated it would be suspicious, only if the
minor had previously given their explicit consent.
Blocking content from the minors or thoroughly monitoring
their every online-move should not be the solution as it violates
the privacy of the adolescents. The proposed architecture
advertises the collaboration between parents and children and
aims at bringing the family to work together to protect the
vulnerable groups of the Internet while using OSNs.
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